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A Behavioral-Economics Approach to Auditors'
Risk Assessments
William S. Waller
University of Arizona
Strict Bayesians are legitimately challenged to tell us where they get their numbers.
I. Levi
To establish a sound basis for a decision about the audit report, auditors process a
variety of information which, in light of prior knowledge, sufficiently limits their
uncertainty about misstatements in auditee assertions. As a frame for research on the
problem of limiting such uncertainty, three general aspects may be distinguished:
normative, descriptive, and prescriptive (Ashton et al. 1988). The normative aspect
concerns the manner in which auditors, as unboundedly rational economic agents,
should structure and solve the problem. The descriptive aspect concerns the manner in
which auditors, as boundedly rational economic agents with limited cognitive
capacity, structure and solve the problem in actuality. The prescriptive aspect concerns
the ways in which boundedly rational auditors might improve on their current solution
to the problem. This distinction is both important and problematic. It is important,
because it reflects the dual role of auditing research, which is to understand and
improve behavior in practical settings. It is problematic, because it raises difficult
issues about how the three aspects relate to each other. Central to this relationship, in
auditing as well as other areas of judgment and decision making, is the rational choice
model, i.e., expected utility maximization under the subjective or Bayesian interpreta
tion of probability (Savage 1954).
Applications of the rational choice model in specific economic domains tend to use
one of four approaches: positivistic, decision-analytic, heuristic-and-bias, generalized.
The positivistic approach adopts the view that understanding an economic agent's
behavior requires the assumption that the individual is acting rationally with respect to
his or her opportunities, beliefs, and desires (Schoemaker 1982). Economic agents by
assumption are Bayesian expected-utility maximizers, and a goal of research is to
explain behavior by inferring agents' utilities and subjective probabilities, without
regard to the psychological reality of these constructs. Given this assumption, the
positivistic approach effectively rules out the possibility of agent error (Einhorn and
Hogarth 1981a). Apparent inconsistencies between agent behavior and the rational
choice model are handled by re-specifying the model (e.g., adding arguments to the
utility function) or the assumed conditions of the setting to which the model is applied
(e.g., viewing the setting as strategic rather than parametric), not by relaxing the
assumption of rationality. The decision-analytic approach uses the rational choice
model prescriptively as a means for structuring a real agent's problem (Raiffa 1968).
Unlike the positivistic approach's goal of inferring an agent's utilities and subjective
probabilities, the decision-analytic approach seeks to construct these numbers so as to
facilitate choice, with no attempt to describe or explain how the agent might otherwise
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decide. The heuristic-and-bias approach uses the model as a normative benchmark for
evaluating behavior (Kahneman et al. 1982). Inconsistencies are seen as errors or
biases, which are caused by cognitive factors and dealt with by corrective devices that
move behavior closer to the model. The generalized approach is an analytical hybrid
that covers empirical regularities, including persistent inconsistencies, by relaxing one
or more axioms of the rational choice model (Chew 1983; Machina 1982). Besides
accounting for past observations, the generalized approach has produced new predic
tions and related empirical testing (Camerer 1989; Chew and Waller 1986).
To achieve both the descriptive goal of understanding behavior and the prescriptive
goal of improving behavior, none of the above approaches is entirely satisfactory. At
one extreme, so long as the positivistic approach assumes away the possibility of error,
its prescriptive value is limited to changes in the environment to which rational agents
adapt, with nothing to say about how real agents might better adapt to a given environ
ment. At the other extreme, the decision-analytic approach is primarily prescriptive,
despite an increased sensitivity to psychological research among decision analysts
(Bell et al. 1988; von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986). The heuristic-and-bias approach
is limited by its implicit assumption that the evaluator and evaluatee share the same
specification of the problem (Berkeley and Humphreys 1982; Cohen 1979). When this
assumption is wrong, inconsistencies cannot be unambiguously classified as errors, and
the approach loses its prescriptive value. Also, the heuristic-and-bias approach focuses
on the adverse consequences of using heuristics, rather than taking a balanced view of
the benefits and costs (Christensen-Szalanski and Beach 1984). Those who use the
generalized approach typically do not tout their hybrid models as normatively correct.
Axioms of the rational choice model are relaxed to account for empirical data, not to
improve decisions (Edwards 1992). Finally, and especially important in auditing, none
of the approaches systematically takes into account the effects of organizational poli
cies and constraints on individual judgments and decisions.
This paper adopts an alternative approach to applying the rational choice model. As
in complete versus simplified analyses (Demski 1980), the alternative approach
stresses Simon's (1982, 1987a) distinction between unbounded and bounded ratio
nality. The unboundedly rational agent effortlessly expresses all elements and
implications of a knowledge base in terms of expected utility, producing a complete
decision model as i f analysis were a free good. For the boundedly rational agent,
however, analysis is costly, leading to simplifications, e.g., partial mining of the
knowledge base and heuristics for probability assessment. As a first approximation,
persistent inconsistencies between agent behavior and models of unbounded ratio
nality indicate not errors, but economizing on the cost of analysis (cf. Marschak 1968;
Shugan 1980). Each simplification trades off saving analysis costs and incurring the
opportunity cost of simplified analysis. The task for economic agents is to find the
optimal simplification, despite the infeasibility of a higher-order, complete analysis.
Facing the same constraint, the task for researchers is to explain, evaluate, and pre
scribe improvements in the simplifications used by real economic agents. A starting
point for such research is observation of the standard practices of agents in specific
economic domains by way of contrast with the rational choice model, without
presuming that the current state of affairs is necessarily optimal or that models of
unbounded rationality are necessarily appropriate for evaluation and prescription.
Such observation provides a basis for hypotheses regarding agents' trade-offs between
the analysis and opportunity costs of simplification, and for prescriptions of new
simplifications with improved trade-offs. In line with Simon (1982, 1987b), this
paper's approach is referred to as the behavioral-economics (BE) approach.
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Although related to other approaches, the BE approach differs in important ways.
Unlike the positivistic approach, the BE approach admits the possibility of agent error
and improvement. Positivistic extensions of the rational choice model that include opti
mization given analysis costs lead to infinite regress, contribute minimally to the
descriptive goal of understanding behavior, and implicitly endorse the status quo rather
than contributing to the prescriptive goal of improving behavior. A complete analysis of
alternative simplifications is infeasible, so there can be no guarantee that any particular
simplification is optimal. Besides explaining standard practices, the BE approach
intends to produce innovations with improved (not to say optimal) trade-offs, e.g.,
reducing analysis costs while holding opportunity costs constant. Unlike the general
ized approach, the BE approach focuses on human information processing limitations
as a causal determinant of behavior. Although the heuristic-and-bias approach has a
similar focus, the BE approach differs by not presuming that inconsistencies vis-a-vis
the rational choice model are errors, instead taking a balanced view of the benefits and
costs of simplification. The BE approach differs from the decision-analytic approach by
emphasizing that attempts to mimic the rational choice model may not be worth the
costs, even for decisions in field settings where the stakes are high (March 1978).
Because such attempts are a type of simplification, decision analysis may be subsumed
under the BE approach. Finally, as demonstrated below, the BE approach easily covers
cases in which simplifications are chosen by policy makers at the organizational or
professional level. In such cases, individual judgments and decisions amount to policy
execution, indicating a need for researchers to expand their attention to include expla
nation and evaluation of the policy, not just individual behavior.
In audit planning, auditors must assess the risk of material misstatement in the
auditee financial statements, relative to generally accepted accounting principles.
General policy and standard practices for auditors' risk assessments are stated in
AICPA Professional Standards, Volume 1, U.S. Auditing Standards (referred to below
as Standards). Contrasting such practices with the rational choice model is a starting
point for descriptive and prescriptive research under the BE approach. The Standards
contain various inconsistencies with Bayesian postulates (i.e., coherence, total evi
dence, and conditionalization) of the rational choice model: (1) risk is decomposed in
ways that are inconsistent with coherence and total evidence; (2) risk is revised in
ways that are inconsistent with conditionalization; (3) second-order uncertainty about
risk assessments is dealt with in ways that are inconsistent with coherence and that
confound belief and value. Each inconsistency may be explained in terms of trade-offs
between the analysis and opportunity costs of simplification. For example, auditors'
simplifications for assessing risk allow for second-order uncertainty, because
constructing precise subjective probabilities would entail excessive analysis costs,
relative to the gain from precision. In other words, second-order uncertainty is a proxy
for economizing on analysis costs. For each inconsistency, the paper identifies issues
for descriptive and prescriptive research under the BE approach.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briefly states the
Bayesian postulates and their relevance to boundedly rational economic agents.
Section 2 describes the audit risk model in the Standards and how it is implemented
by a major public accounting firm. Section 3 employs the BE approach to examine
the three inconsistencies stated above. Section 4 provides some concluding remarks.
1

Readers who are familiar with the audit risk model may prefer to skim or skip the second section.
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Three Bayesian Postulates
A n unboundedly rational agent's belief about the state of the world, M, conforms to
three postulates: coherence, total evidence, and conditionalization (Seidenfeld 1979).
Coherence requires that the agent's belief is representable as a unique subjective prob
ability, P (M),
where K indicates that the subjective probability is based on the
agent's knowledge at the time of assessment. Total evidence requires that K is a
consistent, deductively closed knowledge base, the import of which is fully captured
by P (M). Conditionalization requires that changes in the agent's belief follow Bayes'
theorem. Let E designate new evidence and K' designate the agent's updated knowl
edge base, i.e., the deductive consequences of K and E. Given P (E) > 0,
conditionalization requires that:
K

K

K

P (E\M)
K

P (M\E)
K

•

=

P (M)
K

,

(1)

P (E)
K

and upon observing E,
P \M)
K

= P (M\E).
K

(2)

It is worth emphasizing that Eq. 1 (Bayes' theorem) provides a rule of internal
consistency with respect to a fixed knowledge base, K, and Eq. 2 provides a rule of
belief revision from K to K'. Further, Eq. 2 is tautological in that E must be the entire
change in knowledge from K to K' (Weirich 1983).
For boundedly rational agents, conformance to these postulates entails analysis
costs. Although decision analysts offer simple techniques for producing precise proba
bility assessments (Spetzler and Stael von Holstein 1975), agents may conclude that
the precision is imposed by the techniques rather than being a reflection of belief
(Brown 1990). This conclusion highlights a problem in simultaneously satisfying the
coherence and total evidence postulates: agents know their beliefs are less precise than
the techniques' coherent measurement of them. The limited precision of real agents'
uncertain beliefs has led theorists employing the generalized approach to relax coher
ence and use an interval of probability as a primitive in their axiomatizations
(Fishburn 1986). Other problems with the total evidence and conditionalization postu
lates arise when human information processing limitations are considered (Goldman
1993). In this regard, Brown and Lindley (1982, 120) characterized the agent's knowl
edge base as a psychological field:
which comprises the totality of his cognitive processes, experience, memory, or indeed anything
which may be actually or potentially in his mind.... Usually (the agent) will only consider part of
his psychological field but may extend this part by including extra material. Such an extension will
be referred to as "digging" in his psychological field. This "digging" process may be contrasted with
the process of (the agent) collecting data from his external world.

A problem for boundedly rational agents is that the "digging" tools (i.e., cognitive
processes) from one part of the psychological field limit the material which can be
dug from other parts. Information in their mind may not be on their mind when
making probability assessments. Researchers employing the heuristic-and-bias
approach emphasize such limitations (Kahneman et al. 1982). The computational
burden of E q . 1 may be severe, especially as the number of possible pieces of
evidence increases (Harman 1986). Conditionalization requires agents to build a
protocol representing not only the evidence actually observed, but also evidence that
could have been observed (Shafer 1985), and to imagine for each possible piece of
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evidence an ex post knowledge state which comprises all implications of the evidence
conjoined with ex ante knowledge. Such requirements may be problematic even in
stylized, textbook cases (Bar-Hillel and Falk 1982). In practical domains, the analysis
cost of conformance to the Bayesian postulates raises doubt about the rational choice
model's applicability for evaluation and prescription as well as description and expla
nation. The use of simplifications should be expected for real economic agents.

Audit Risk Model
The Standards and audit policy manuals of public accounting firms provide consid
erable guidance on risk analysis, including the conceptualization of risk and the
factors to be considered when making risk assessments. Such guidance is based on the
audit risk model, which represents the risk components that auditors assess or control
through decisions about the nature, extent, and timing of test procedures. The key
component is audit risk (AR), the risk that an auditee assertion contains a misstate
ment which is not detected by the auditor. A goal in auditing is to limit AR to an
adequately low level. To achieve this goal, the audit risk model uses a decomposition
strategy. At one level, AR is decomposed into auditee risk (AER) and auditor risk
(ARR). AER is the risk that an auditee financial statement assertion contains a
misstatement before the audit, and ARR is the risk that the auditor fails to detect a
misstatement which is present. AER is assessed by the auditor, whereas ARR is
controlled through the choice of test procedures. A t a second level, AER may be
decomposed into inherent risk (IR) and control risk (CR). IR is the risk that a
misstatement occurs, assuming the auditee has no related controls, and CR is the risk
that a misstatement is not prevented or detected (and corrected) on a timely basis by
auditee controls. The audit risk model relates these components as follows:
2

AR = AER x ARR,
AR = IR x CR x ARR.

(3a)
(3b)

In audit planning, the auditor sets a target for AR, makes separate assessments of IR
and CR, or a direct assessment of AER, and selects test procedures such that ARR =
AR/(IR x CR).
The Standards allow for a variety of specific applications of the audit risk model.
For concreteness, it is useful to describe the risk assessment task as performed by a
major public accounting firm. This firm operationalizes a material misstatement by
computing a monetary amount at the financial statement level as a function of auditee
size and allocating the amount to accounts and assertions (tolerable error). In audit
planning, the auditor's task is to assess the risk that an assertion contains a misstate
ment exceeding tolerable error. This task is decomposed into separate assessments of
IR and CR. IR is assessed on a verbal scale: low (IR ), moderate (IR ), high (IR ).
Auditors are told to consider many factors when assessing IR, such as misstatements
detected by previous audits, the complexity and subjectivity of accounting procedures,
the competence and integrity of auditee personnel, and other auditee characteristics
(operations, industry, financing arrangements, profitability, and so on). The firm's
audit policy manual indicates how each factor generally affects IR, but it also stresses
the role of judgment by stating that no mathematical weighting of factors is appro
priate, since each IR assessment depends on the circumstances.
3

l

2

3

m

The Standards permit either separate assessments of IR and CR, or a combined assessment.
The firm is KPMG Peat Marwick.
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As a preliminary to assessing CR on a similar scale, the auditor evaluates and
performs tests of auditee controls. As with IR, many factors are supposed to be consid
ered when assessing CR, such as the auditee's segregation of duties, its protection of
assets and records, and its management's operating style and philosophy toward
controls. A t this point, the auditor considers the decision of whether to rely on
controls as a partial substitute for substantive tests, e.g., collecting for close scrutiny a
sample of documents that underlie financial statement assertions. Such reliance in
volves a CR assessment below the maximum, CR , with a corresponding increase in
ARR and reduction in substantive tests. Overall audit costs generally are lower when
reliance on auditee controls is substituted for substantive tests. But, the reliance option
requires additional, costly evaluation, documentation, and testing of controls to
support the lower CR assessment. The nonreliance option requires no further analysis
and implies a CR assessment. The latter option is selected if (1) controls are initially
perceived to be weak or (2) the extra cost of analysis with the reliance option exceeds
the possible benefit, i.e., a reduction in substantive tests.
Given assessments of IR and CR, the auditor consults a risk table mapping each
combination of IR and CR on the verbal scale into ARR on a [0,1] scale, given a target
AR. The ARR value affects the auditor's decision about test procedures, e.g., required
sample sizes decrease as ARR increases, other things equal. The risk table implicitly
relies on numerical point values of IR (IR = .36, IR = .67, IR = 1.00) and CR (CR
= .18, CR = .44, CR = 1.00). To illustrate, when the auditor assesses IR and CR ,
ARR=AR/(IR x CR ) = .04/(.67 x .44) = .14. Like many simplifications in auditing,
the point values reflect a conservative bias. In an archival study of auditors' risk
assessments in field settings, Waller (1993) reported that the rate of detected misstate
ments was .03 when auditors assess IR , .08 when IR , and .14 when IR , controlling
for CR. Even i f adjusted for reasonable estimates of undetected misstatements, the
rate of misstatements for each level of IR would be far below the corresponding
implicit point values in the risk table. In addition, the firm's audit policy manual
instructs each auditor to interpret the verbal scale in terms of intervals rather than
point values (.00-.40 for IR , .40-.60 for IR , .60-1.00 for IR , .00-.20 for CR , .20-.40
for CR , .40-1.00 for CR ). The risk table's implicit point values are set near the
upper limit of the corresponding interval. Audit policy makers incorporate such
conservative biases to ensure effectiveness, i.e., reaching the proper conclusion about
the presence or absence of misstatements, despite the possible inefficiency of exces
sive testing.
Auditors must assess IR and CR at the assertion level for each significant financial
statement account or transaction cycle. In effect, risk is decomposed from the account
to assertion level, such that a misstatement in any assertion implies a misstatement in
the account. For example, regarding an asset account such as trade accounts receiv
able, auditors assess IR and CR for the following assertions: completeness (all
exchanges that should be recorded by the auditee are recorded), existence (all
exchanges recorded by the auditee are valid), accuracy (all exchanges recorded by the
auditee are recorded accurately), valuation (items in the auditee financial statements
are valued in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles), and ownership (the auditee has appropriate rights to items in its financial statements). For trade
accounts receivable, auditors thus make ten separate risk assessments (two types of
risk x five assertions). In principle, this decomposition strategy allows for fine-tuned
decisions about test procedures on an assertion-by-assertion basis.
h
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Inconsistencies Between Audit Risk Model and Bayesian Postulates
The Standards do not clarify the relationship between the audit risk model and
probability theory. Even so, it is straightforward (to a point) to restate the audit risk
model probabilistically. Consider the event sequence in Figure 1, where M is the event
of a misstatement, C is the event of detection (and correction) of a misstatement by
auditee controls, and D is the event of detection of a misstatement by the auditor (cf.
Graham 1985). Based on this sequence, the risk of M, the risk of -C given M , and the
risk of -D given M and -C, are represented by IR, CR, and ARR, respectively (but see
below). As suggested by Eq. 3b, a misstatement in an audited assertion involves the
conjunction of M, -C, and -D, the risk of which is represented by AR. In Bayesian
terms, an auditor's subjective probability of a component event, say M, may be repre
sented as P (M). For two component events, say C and M, P (C\M)
represents an
auditor's subjective probability of C, given the assumption of M. Along these lines,
Eq. 3a may be restated as:
4

K

K

P (M
K

& -C & -D) = P (M

& -C) x P (D\M

K

K

& -C).

(4)

The first term on the right side of Eq. 4 is the auditor's prior belief about the presence
or absence of a misstatement in an unaudited assertion, and the second term is the
auditor's belief that planned test procedures will fail to detect a misstatement which is
present.

Figure 1. Event Sequence.
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yes

Detection
and
correction
by
controls?
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yes

•

•

x

D

x

ARR
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Extending the Bayesian representation of audit risk beyond Eq. 4 reveals at least
three inconsistencies in auditors' standard practices: the decomposition of AER as IR x
CR is inconsistent with the postulates of coherence and total evidence; IR and CR
assessments are revised in light of new evidence, but not via conditionalization; and,
IR and CR assessments reflect second-order uncertainty, which is inconsistent with the
coherence postulate, and often reflect analysis costs rather than beliefs, which is
inconsistent with the distinction between value and belief in the rational choice model.
Below, these inconsistencies are examined under the BE approach.
Decomposition
The rational choice model permits a decision problem to be structured in many
equivalent ways, e.g., an agent's belief about a target event may be stated directly or in
terms of component events. Under the positivistic approach, such flexibility has no
relevance, since the behavior of unboundedly rational agents is invariant to the
4

The Standards are equivocal regarding the concept of AR. Eq. 3b suggests the interpretation of AR as the
risk of the conjunction of M, -C, and -D. Elsewhere, the Standards suggest the interpretation of AR as the
posterior risk of M given -C and -D.
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problem structure (Tversky and Kahneman 1986). In contrast, the decision-analytic
approach exploits the rational choice model's flexibility:
The spirit of decision analysis is divide and conquer: Decompose a complex problem into simpler
problems, get one's thinking straight in these simpler problems, paste these analyses together with a
logical glue, and come out with a program for action for the complex problem. Experts are not
asked complicated, fuzzy questions, but crystal clear, unambiguous, elemental, hypothetical questions (Raiffa 1968, 271).

Decomposition is guided by two principles. First, there must be a theory-based link
between components to permit a proper integration of separate assessments. The rules
of probability provide the logical glue for integrating an agent's assessments of
component events. Second, there must be an overall gain i n effectiveness or efficiency
from performing two or more assessment tasks, each with a relatively narrow focus,
versus a holistic assessment.
Under the BE approach, decomposition is seen as a method for producing alterna
tive simplifications which may affect an agent's analysis cost and degree of
conformance to the Bayesian postulates. Decomposition of a target event into compo
nent events may allow a boundedly rational agent to partition elements of the
psychological field by their relevance to each component event. Performing two or
more assessments, each relating a component event with relevant knowledge, may
increase conformance to the total evidence postulate, without increasing the cost of
analysis (Armstrong et al. 1975). Also, by dividing a target event for which belief is
imprecise into simpler events that can be reasonably assessed with greater precision,
decomposition may increase conformance to the coherence postulate (Phillips 1973).
Finally, the mechanical integration of assessments of each term on the right side of
Eq. 1, in place of a holistic assessment of the left side, may aid conformance to
conditionalization (Edwards and Phillips 1964).
The audit risk model includes the decomposition of AER into IR x CR (Eq. 3b).
Curiously, this decomposition emerged gradually over time and is not based on formal
theory (Colbert 1987). Conventional wisdom in auditing has long recognized the need
to consider the inherent riskiness of accounts or transactions, e.g., such risk is higher
for an inventory of gold than pyrite. Early policy statements on audit risk (AICPA
1972, 1981) nevertheless suggested that auditors suppress the effect of IR on ARR:
The risk that monetary errors equal to tolerable error would have occurred in the absence of internal
accounting controls related to the account balance or class of transactions under audit (IR) is difficult and potentially costly to quantify. For this reason in this model it is implicitly set conservatively
at one, although audit experience indicates clearly that it is substantially lower (AICPA 1981,17).

Subsequent policy statements (AICPA 1983, 1988) contrarily emphasized that AER
includes IR as well as CR. Both risks must be assessed, separately or jointly, and an
amendment to AICPA (1981) explicitly introduced Eq. 3b. Allowance for IR below the
maximum has two positive effects. First, audit efficiency increases in that auditors
may take credit for their knowledge about the inherent riskiness of misstatement in
particular circumstances; E q . 3b shows that ARR increases (and required testing
decreases) as IR decreases. Second, performing the task of assessing IR causes
auditors to consider risk factors that affect IR in addition to those that affect CR,
increasing conformance to the total evidence postulate. Regarding analysis costs, early
policy statements may have overstated the difficulty of assessing IR, e.g., mis
statements detected by previous audits and unusual transactions for which auditee
personnel lack familiarity are readily available, reliable cues of current misstatements
(Houghton and Fogarty 1991). In sum, the decomposition of AER as IR x CR appears
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to increase audit efficiency and conformance to total evidence, with little or no in
crease in analysis costs.
Unfortunately, not every division leads to a clear conquest (Burns and Pearl 1981;
Chakravarti et al. 1979). Because the decomposition in Eq. 3b is not theory-based, it
may lack the logical glue for integrating the components as intended. For comparison,
consider a theory-based decomposition of P (M & -C) from Eq. 4:
K

P (M & -C) = P (M) X P (C\M).
K

K

(5)

K

Although Eq. 5 is superficially similar to AER = IR x CR, it does not capture IR
and CR as defined in the Standards. CR is the risk that controls fail to prevent or
detect a misstatement that occurs. But, P (C\M) reflects only the detective effect, and
adding an event to Eq. 5 to represent the preventive effect does not achieve identity
with E q . 3b. Unlike theory-based decompositions, E q . 3b lacks a clear event
sequence, such as detection cannot precede a misstatement which in turn cannot
precede prevention. B y including both the preventive and detective aspects of
controls, CR confuses the temporal order of prevention and detection vis-a-vis the
occurrence of a misstatement. Also, IR is the risk of misstatement, assuming there are
no related controls, which fails to recognize that the preventive effect may precede the
(non)occurrence of a misstatement. In Eq. 5, P (M) does not make this assumption.
On the contrary, since auditors normally have at least some information about controls
when they assess IR, P (M) entails rejecting the assumption. On this point, the
Standards in effect compel auditors to violate the total evidence postulate, and,
because there is no logical basis that supports AER = IR x CR, auditors' conformance
to the coherence postulate is open to question. The benefits of the decomposition in
Eq. 3b are at least partially offset by its opportunity costs.
In seeking alternative simplifications for assessing AER, an important issue concerns
the knowledge-based dependence between variables such as IR and CR. This depen
dence complicates a meaningful partition of elements in the auditors' psychological
field by their relevance to the inherent riskiness of misstatement versus the perceived
effectiveness of auditee controls. Kinney (1984,129) gave the following example:
K

5

K

K

(W)e might ask a gun control worker (at an airport) to assess the joint probability that a plane
departing the airport has one or more guns on board. Alternatively, we might ask the worker to estimate the number that would, in the absence of all controls, carry a gun on board and the number that
would be caught by the controls. The worker's response to the alternative question is likely to be
"How should I know? I've never observed would-be passengers without the control."

Just as passengers' gun toting depends on expectations about airport screening,
employees' behavior (e.g., negligence or fraud) is influenced by the effectiveness of
auditee controls (Cushing and Loebbecke 1983). Obversely, auditee management
normally would effect tighter controls over significant assets that are vulnerable to
loss (Graham 1985). A simplification that overcomes the dependence problem is to
avoid decomposition and instead require a holistic AER assessment, perhaps with the
aid of a checklist that brings to mind key risk factors, and some public accounting
firms have adopted this policy. Another simplification is to re-define IR and CR along
the lines of E q . 5. Based on prior knowledge and auditee-specific information
(including preventive controls), the auditor would assess P (M), the risk of misstate
ment prior to the application of detective controls, and P (C\M), the risk that detective
controls are ineffective assuming the occurrence of a misstatement. These assessments
K

K

5

The Appendix shows a decomposition in which similar inconsistencies arise when the preventive and
detective effects of controls are distinguished. See Leslie (1984) for a related discussion.
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would be integrated v i a E q . 5 and affect planning via E q . 4. Conformance to
coherence and total evidence similarly may be enhanced by decision-analytic simplifi
cations that decompose AER or P (M & -C) in terms of causal or diagnostic factors in
K (Ravinder et al. 1988; Kleinmuntz 1990), but such decompositions may signifi
cantly increase overall analysis costs. After identifying a set of alternative
simplifications that by design ensure coherence, the general issue for prescriptive
research under the BE approach is to evaluate the alternatives based on proxies for
analysis costs (e.g., time taken), conformance to total evidence (e.g., number and type
of risk factors taken into account), and effectiveness (e.g., calibration or accuracy).
Such evidence would facilitate policy makers' choice of simplification.
K

Belief Revision
In the processing of observational events, conditionalization has static and dynamic
aspects. Regarding the static aspect, an agent specifies the events and probabilities in
Eq. 1, holding knowledge constant at K. The agent must not only assess each proba
bility on the right side of Eq. 1, but also anticipate and incorporate into the event
structure all possible observations on the basis of K . This analysis produces a set of
preposterior conditional probabilities, e.g., P (M\E)
and P (M\-E).
Regarding the
dynamic aspect, the agent specifies P (M) in Eq. 2 by selecting the conditional prob
ability whose conditioning event has been observed. The static and dynamic aspects
are bridged by the assumption that either E or -E, as specified on the basis of K,
constitutes the entire change in knowledge from K to K ' . Without this assumption, the
agent's belief revision may be affected by extraconditional information, i.e., differ
ences between K and K' that go beyond E or -E (Waller and Mitchell 1991). It has
long been recognized that conditionalization unravels when such information arises
(Ramsey 1931). To rule out extraconditional information, unboundedly rational agents
must not only exhaustively mine K when specifying Eq. 1, but also must know the
external environment well enough to formulate an objectively correct model or
protocol of what might be observed (Shafer 1985). In this regard, the Bayesian inter
pretation of probability is not entirely subjective, since it requires veridical beliefs
about information that the external environment might reveal.
For boundedly rational agents, the bridging assumption is unlikely to hold. Costly
analysis and limited knowledge prevent boundedly rational agents from formulating a
subjectively complete, much less an objectively correct, model of what might be
observed. Instead, these agents economize on analysis costs by employing condition
ing events that are, and are perceived to be, abstractions of potentially observable
information. Rather than specify all (known) possible observations in terms of Eq. 1
and update via Eq. 2, boundedly rational agents employ "wait and see" simplifications
that (1) anticipate observation of, but do not pre-specify, information beyond E or -E,
and (2) accomodate information that happens to be observed. Anticipation of some
extraconditional information, along with the intention to accomodate relevant infor
mation as it is observed, sets the stage for inconsistencies with respect to Eq. 2. Such
inconsistencies are not errors. Rather, conditionalization simply is not applicable for
K

K

K'

6
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This interpretation differs from viewing belief revision as updating a prior, unconditional probability to a
posterior, conditional probability in light of new information. Because P (M\E) and P (M\-E) are known or
computable ex ante, the relation of P (M) with either P (M\E) or P (M\-E) pertains to internal consistency
with respect to K, not to belief revision from K to K'. Also, this interpretation does not suggest that the
Bayesian apparatus cannot accomodate "surprises," i.e., unanticipated information. This can be done via
retrospective conditioning (Diaconis and Zabell 1982).
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evaluating the belief revision processes of boundedly rational agents. Consider an
example based on Einhorn and Hogarth (1981b). A basketball coach is assessing her
team's chances against an opponent to be played twice during the season. Knowing
little about the opponent prior to game one (K), the coach assesses P (G ) = P (-G )
= .50 and P ( G \ G ) > .50 > P (G \-G ),
where G is the event that the coach's team
wins game i. Unfortunately, the coach's team loses the first game. Besides absorbing
the outcome (-G ), the coach intently watched the game itself, such that her updated
knowledge base (K') contains considerable information about the opponent's style of
play, and so on. The coach now assesses P (G2) > .50. The inconsistency of P (G2)
≠P (G2\-G ) is not an error, because the change in knowledge from K and K' includes
extraconditional information. The bridging assumption does not hold, and conditional
ization is not applicable. The coach should plan the rematch given her beliefs based on
K' rather than those based on K, consistent with the total evidence postulate.
Performing an audit may be divided into a planning stage and an evidence evalua
tion stage. In the planning stage, auditors rely heavily on the audit risk model: planned
test procedures must have a sufficiently low ARR to achieve the target AR, given an
AER assessment (where AER, ARR, and AR are ex ante with respect to observed
evidence). In the evaluation stage, continued reliance on the audit risk model is prob
lematic, because the event structure of Eq. 3a is underspecified relative to Eqs. 1 and
2. Taking an example from Kinney (1989), suppose an auditor has a target AR of .05,
assesses AER at .40, and sets ARR at .125, using Eq. 3a. If test procedures do not
detect a misstatement, then target AR presumably has been achieved. But, if achieved
AR is defined as the posterior risk of misstatement (see note 4), then this presumption
is true only under limited conditions. Although the audit risk model incorporates the
risk of incorrect acceptance, i.e, ARR or P (-D\M
& -C), it ignores the risk of incor
rect rejection, i.e., P (D\-M
& -C). Suppose P (D\-M
& -C) is .10 for planned test
procedures. Using Eq. 1, P (M\-C
& -D) = .125 x .40 / (.125 x .40 + .90 x .60) = .085.
Achieved AR exceeds target AR. This sort of specification problem has been empha
sized in many critiques of the audit risk model (Cushing and Loebbecke 1983; Kinney
1983, 1984, 1989; Leslie 1984; Sennetti 1990).
Beyond these critiques, the crucial point under the BE approach is that analysis
costs inevitably cause the belief revision processes of boundedly rational auditors to
be underspecified relative to Eqs. 1 and 2. A consequence is that, in contrast with
conditionalization, auditors' belief revision is open to information that is anticipated
but not pre-specified in terms of exclusive and exhaustive observational events. In the
audit risk model, the pre-specified observational event is D or -D, i.e., the auditor's
detection or nondetection of a misstatement that exceeds tolerable error. This event is,
and is perceived to be, an abstraction of what might be observed during the audit.
Designating K (K') as the auditor's knowledge in the planning (evaluation) stage,
changes from K to K' go beyond the observation of either D or D. In particular, when
the application of planned test procedures yields -D, auditors nevertheless consider the
implications of other observed information for misstatements that may have escaped
detection and, as deemed necessary, perform additional test procedures. To accomo
date changes from K to K' that go beyond -D, auditors' belief revision processes must
be more comprehensive, and less formal, than either Eq. 3a or Eqs. 1 and 2.
The Standards implicitly recognize this underspecification problem and require
auditors to employ various "wait and see" simplifications for belief revision during the
evidence evaluation stage. Consider two variants. First, in audit applications of statis
tical sampling, where the rules for accepting or rejecting auditee assertions are closely
linked to the frequency or amounts of misstatements in the sample, auditors must
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consider the qualitative aspects of detected misstatements such as their nature and
cause. Instead of incurring analysis costs to pre-specify such qualitative features as part
of the sampling plan, auditors employ a "wait and see" simplification in which they
judgmentally evaluate misstatements observed in the sample. Such evaluation may lead
to inferences that supplement the statistical inferences from sample results, e.g., auditee
controls are weaker than expected. The analysis cost savings from this simplification
may be partially offset, however, by an opportunity cost resulting from biased judg
ments about the nature or causes of misstatements (Burgstahler and Jiambalvo 1986).
Second, and more generally, the Standards require auditors to consider whether a re
assessment of AER (or, IR and CR separately) is needed in light of any information
observed in the evaluation stage. Recognizing that the audit is a cumulative process of
evidence collection and evaluation, the Standards note the possibility that the auditor's
updated knowledge, K', may include information that conflicts with K, the auditor's
knowledge when assessing AER in the planning stage. In such cases, auditors must
reconsider the adequacy of planned test procedures based on a re-assessment of AER
given K', instead of K. Such re-assessments are curious from a Bayesian perspective,
since they involve retrospectively constructing, rather than updating, a prior belief in
light of new information (but see Diaconis and Zabell 1982). They also pose the cognitively challenging task of renewed "digging" in an extended psychological field. In
effect, the Standards establish an equivalence criterion: the adequacy of applied test
procedures should be insensitive to whether risk-related information is processed
during the planning or evaluation stage. Meeting this criterion may be complicated by
human information processing limitations that cause differences in AER depending on
the timing of assessment, e.g., a part of K that is easy to access during the planning
stage may be relatively inaccessible, as part of K', during the evaluation stage (cf.
Moeckel and Plumlee 1989). Assessing the opportunity costs of "wait and see"
simplifications that economize on analysis costs, e.g., whether they satisfy the equiva
lence criterion, is an important issue for empirical research under the BE approach. In
any event, the conclusion remains that belief revision by boundedly rational economic
agents cannot be reasonably evaluated against a model of unbounded rationality, such
as Bayesian conditionalization, which suppresses analysis costs.
Second-Order Uncertainty
The coherence postulate requires that an agent's belief is representable as a unique
subjective probability (Gardenfors and Sahlin 1982). To illustrate, suppose the goal is
to measure an agent's uncertain belief about an event, M. A decision analyst might
measure the agent's P (M) with a probability wheel, i.e., a disk having two adjustable
sectors (S and -S) with a spinner attached to its center. By adjusting the proportional
area of the two sectors, the analyst can set the probability of the spinner stopping in S
to any desired value, P (S). With an initial setting of P (S) = .50, the agent is offered
two bets: a prize of $10 if M occurs, versus a prize of $10 i f S occurs. A preference for
the first bet implies P (M) > .50; a preference for the second bet implies P (M) < .50.
By repeatedly adjusting the wheel until the agent is indifferent between the bets, i.e.,
P (M) = P (S), the analyst can measure the agent's belief to any desired precision. In
effect, the coherence postulate requires that agents view uncertain events as compa
rable to risky events with known probabilities.
For boundedly rational agents, belief representation according to the coherence
postulate has two problems. First, coherence overrepresents belief by imposing too
much precision, as noted earlier. Under the probability wheel, an agent may be able to
state a definite preference between the bets when P (S) is .10 or .50, but not when
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P (S) is between .25 and .30. Stated differently, the agent may have second-order
uncertainty about a precise measure of his or her degree of belief, which is costly i f not
impossible to eliminate through analysis of a fixed knowledge base. Second, coherence
underrepresents belief by failing to reflect the quality of agents' knowledge. For any
two knowledge states, K and K " , so long as P (M) = P (M),
the rational choice
model requires agents to act as i f K' and K" were equivalent. But, a voluminous
psychological literature on ambiguity indicates that real agents are sensitive to K,
controlling for P (M) (for reviews see Camerer and Weber 1992; Einhorn and Hogarth
1985; Frisch and Baron 1988). In particular, second-order uncertainty is inversely asso
ciated with the quality of K, and actions are affected by second-order uncertainty.
Among the many relevant studies in philosophy and psychology, two early contri
butions are noteworthy here. Popper (1959) questioned the rational choice model's
treatment of "ideal" evidence. Suppose M is the event that a coin lands "heads" on its
next flip, where the coin may be fair or biased to any degree. A rational belief is
P (M) = .50. Suppose E is "ideal" evidence from a large number of flips of this coin
with exactly 50% being "heads". On the evidence, a rational belief is P (M) =
P (M\E) = P (M) = .50, where E is the entire change from K to K ' . This is the
paradox of ideal evidence: strong empirical evidence is irrelevant, because it has no
impact on rational belief (Bar-Hillel 1982). Ellsberg (1961) also questioned whether
agents' uncertain beliefs are captured by a precise subjective probability. Suppose
there are two urns, each containing 100 red or black balls. A ball will be drawn at
random from one of the urns. Let R (B ) designate drawing a red (black) ball from
Urn 1, and R (B ) designate drawing a red (black) ball from Urn 2. A n agent bets on
a color and wins $10 if a ball with her color is drawn. Available information about the
urns varies: the proportion of red balls in Urn 1 is 50%, but the proportion in Urn 2 is
unknown. The agent is asked about her preferences between betting on R and R , and
between betting on B and B . Because the proportions are known for Urn 1, but not
for Urn 2, she prefers R and B . Such preferences imply beliefs of P (R ) > P (R )
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inconsistent. This is a version of the Ellsberg paradox. Both paradoxes are explained
by agents' sensitivity to the quality of K and the analysis that K supports. In the
paradox of ideal evidence, limited ex ante knowledge may lead an agent to assume
that "heads" and "tails" are equiprobable, absent a reason to believe otherwise, by the
principle of insufficient reason. This principle is a notoriously weak basis for proba
bility assessment, referred to by Popper (1957) as "probability magic or knowledge
out of ignorance." In the Ellsberg paradox, agents similarly may be led to assume that
all proportions (0% to 100%) are equiprobable for Urn 2; the average proportion is
50%. For Urn 1, however, agents can assess P (R ) = P (B )
= .50, by the stronger
principle of direct inference, i.e., assign the probability for a general event class to a
randomly drawn member of that class (Levi 1977). Agents conforming to these para
doxes apparently consider a probability assessment based on the principle of
insufficient reason to be epistemically weaker than one based on knowledge of rele
vant frequencies or proportions, a difference in K that affects actions.
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The Standards implicitly recognize auditors' second-order uncertainty about risk
assessments and provide a variety of coping mechanisms. The Standards state that IR
and CR may be assessed in quantitative or nonquantitative terms, leaving the desired
precision to be set by the individual auditor or public accounting firm. As described in
Section 2, firms use risk scales such as low, moderate, and high. Crude risk scales are
a simplification that reduces auditors' analysis costs, i.e., time and effort spent to dis
criminate between possible risk values, and second-order uncertainty about risk
127

assessments. In an experimental study, Waller (1994) reported evidence confirming
the straightforward prediction that second-order uncertainty is higher when auditors
assess risk on a [0,1] scale versus a low-moderate-high scale. The analysis cost
savings of crude risk scales presumably exceed the potential gain that precise risk
assessments would provide via fine-tuned audit test decisions. The Standards state
that auditors cannot rely completely on risk assessment. Regardless of the subjectively
assessed values of IR and CR, auditors must perform at least minimal substantive tests
that yield objective evidence for significant accounts and transaction cycles. Taking
the extreme case, suppose an auditor assesses AER, or P (M & -C), to be zero. From
a Bayesian perspective, no test procedure is worthwhile, since no new evidence could
change the auditor's prior belief. B y requiring minimal substantive tests, the
Standards acknowledge the subjectivity of risk assessment and concomitant secondorder uncertainty. The Standards emphasize that risk assessment entails analysis costs.
In cases where analysis costs would outweigh the benefit of risk assessment, the
Standards direct auditors to set risk at the maximum; i.e., when auditors are unwilling
to incur the cost of analysis to reduce second-order uncertainty to an acceptable level,
they must incorporate an extreme conservative bias. This confounding of analysis
costs and risk assessments may be especially severe for CR assessments. In an
archival study, Waller (1993) reported that over 80% of CR assessments were at the
maximum. A n explanation is that auditors typically emphasized substantive testing
instead of performing and documenting a thorough analysis of auditee controls.
Finally, the Standards state a general requirement that auditors must have adequate
technical training and proficiency. Public accounting firms economize on the costs of
information search and analysis, and limit second-order uncertainty, by assigning the
risk assessment task to auditors with experience-based knowledge about the auditee
and its industry. Such knowledge substitutes for costly search and analysis, decreases
second-order uncertainty, and sometimes signals a need for further search and analysis
(Mills 1993; Taylor 1994; Waller 1994). Although inconsistent with the coherence
postulate, simplifications that cope with, rather than eliminate, second-order uncer
tainty should not be thereby considered errors. Under the BE approach, such
simplifications may be reasonable means for boundedly rational auditors to econo
mize on analysis costs when making risk assessments. Descriptive and prescriptive
issues for empirical research under the BE approach include: How is auditors' secondorder uncertainty affected by factors such as task experience and the completeness of
case-specific information? How does auditors' second-order uncertainty affect test
decisions? Relative to current standard practices, how do alternative simplifications
for assessing risk (e.g., judgment aids that use base rates) affect auditors' second-order
uncertainty, analysis costs, and effectiveness?
K

Concluding Remarks
Behavioral economics generally is concerned with the empirical validity of
assumptions underlying neoclassical economic theory and, when the assumptions are
empirically invalid, with the implications for explaining human behavior and the oper
ation of economic institutions (Simon 1987b). Much of the BE literature addresses
firm or market phenomena. For example, behavioral economists have been critical of
the neoclassical assumption that firm decision makers possess the knowledge and
computational capacity necessary to maximize profit. Given bounded rationality, there
is a firm cost of profit-maximizing behavior. Drawing out the implications of costly
profit maximization, the BE approach seeks to explain empirical observations at the
firm level of simplified practices, or routines, such as cost-plus pricing (Cyert and
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March 1992). Under the BE approach, the persistence and predominance of certain
routines are seen, not as the solution to an optimization problem that includes all kinds
of costs, but as the product of an evolutionary process whereby routines that improve
a firm's actual profit, relative to the competition, tend to be selected for survival by the
economic system (Nelson and Winter 1982). Similarly, the BE approach is applicable
at the individual level. Drawing out the implications of costly analysis, descriptive re
search seeks to explain the simplifications of boundedly rational agents in specific
economic domains in terms of trade-offs between analysis and opportunity costs.
Also, because there can be no guarantee that the simplifications currently in use
involve optimal trade-offs, innovation and improvement through prescriptive research
are an open possibility. Finally, since individual judgments and decisions often are
components of firm routines, e.g., auditors' risk assessments in producing a financial
statement audit, applications of the BE approach at the individual level may inform,
and be informed by, applications at the firm level.
In this paper, the BE approach was applied to examine inconsistencies between
auditors' standard practices for risk assessment and Bayesian postulates of the rational
choice model. The inconsistencies pertained to event decomposition, belief revision,
and second-order uncertainty. A general conclusion was auditors use simplifications
that economize on analysis costs, e.g., "wait and see" simplifications for belief revi
sion that are open to anticipated but not pre-specified events and simplifications that
allow for and control second-order uncertainty. This conclusion is meant to be
descriptive and not to imply that the simplifications involve optimal cost trade-offs.
On the contrary, there are flaws in the audit risk model's decomposition of AER into
IR x CR, "wait and see" simplifications may have opportunity costs resulting from
judgmental biases when processing observed events, and coping with second-order
uncertainty by incorporating an extreme conservative bias is inefficient. Each incon
sistency suggests descriptive and prescriptive research issues, consistent with the dual
goal of understanding and improving behavior. In pursuing these issues, it is important
to consider three implications of the BE approach. First, descriptive research should
not merely document auditors' patterns of judgment and decision making, but seek to
understand the reasons for their use in terms of analysis and opportunity costs.
Second, evaluative research using normative models, which suppress analysis costs, as
benchmarks must justify the models' applicability to boundedly rational auditors who
economize on such costs. Third, prescriptive research should take into account the
effects of auditors' bounded rationality. Recommendations which cannot be used by
boundedly rational auditors, because of analysis costs, have no prescriptive value.

Appendix
Figure 2 presents an event sequence that separates the preventive and detective
aspects of controls. The sequence has four events: C' is the event of prevention by
controls; M is the event of a misstatement; C" is the event of detection by controls;
and D is the event of detection by the auditor. Thus, a misstatement in audited asser
tions requires the conjunction of -C', M, -C", and -D. It is straightforward to restate
AR = AER x ARR as:
P ( - C ' & M & -C" & -D) = P ( - C ' & M & -C") x P (-D\-C' & M & -C").
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It is not straightforward, however, to restate AER = IR x CR. Consider Eq. A2:
P (-C' & M & -C") = P ( - C ' & M) x P (-C"\-C' & M),
= P (M\-C') x P (-C') x P (-C"\-C & M).
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(A2)

Eq. A 2 is inconsistent with IR and CR as defined in the Standards. P (M\-C)
assumes the condition of a prevention failure, which is not equivalent to the assump
tion of IR that there are no related controls. Also, unlike CR, Eq. A 2 contains two
measures regarding the effectiveness of controls: PK(-C') concerns prevention and
P ( - C " \ - C ' & M) concerns detection, and these do not generally combine into a single
measure that corresponds to CR. The Standards define CR as the "risk that a material
misstatement that could occur in an assertion will not be prevented or detected on a
timely basis by an entity's internal control structure policies and procedures" (AICPA
1993, A U 319, italics added). The italicized phrase may be represented by the
conjunction of -C and - C " , so that P (-C' & -C") would be a single measure corre
sponding to CR:
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P ( - C ' & -C") = P (-C')
x
P (-C"\-C'),
= P (-C')
x { P ( M & -C"\-C') + P (-M
&
-C"\-C')},
= P (-C'){P (-C"\-C
& M) x P (M\-C')
+ P ( - C " \ - C ' & -M) x P (-M\-C')}.
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To achieve identity between Eq. A 4 and the last two terms of Eq. A2, the former must
reduce to:
P ( - C ' & -C") = P (-C)
K

x P ( - C " \ - C ' & M).

K

(A5)

K

Eq. A5 holds only in the special case where P ( M \ - C ' ) = 1, i.e., a prevention failure
necessitates the occurrence of a misstatement. However, a misstatement normally
requires conditions beyond a prevention failure, e.g., employee action.
k

Figure 2. Event Sequence with Prevention by Controls.
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